Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

2008

Working Class Judges
Jason J. Czarnezki
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Jason J. Czarnezki, Christopher Zorn & William D. Henderson, Working Class Judges, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 829
(2008), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/910/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

WORKING CLASS JUDGES
CHRISTOPHER ZORN,* WILLIAM

D.

HENDERSON" &

JASON J. CZARNEZKI***

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a steady chorus of dignitaries has decried the low pay of
federal judges and suggested that the federal judiciary is on the brink of losing
its best and its brightest.' The persistent nature of these claims should give us
pause. Scott Baker's recent study 2 empirically evaluates these claims by
examining the relationship between judicial salaries and the work habits and
voting patterns of federal appellate judges. If large pay disparities are indeed
eroding the quality of the federal bench, Baker theorizes this likely results in
more ideological voting, fewer dissents, longer delays in issuing opinions, and
a self-selection of judges who are intent on maximizing their influence within
the federal judiciary.3
To test these hypotheses, Baker undertook the
formidable task of assembling the requisite datasets, which he then posted on
the Intemet for other researchers to use. Along with the ingenuity of his
research design, we applaud Baker's industry and transparency. Thanks to his
efforts, there is now an empirical literature surrounding the debate over federal
judicial pay.
At the end of his inquiry, Baker concludes that higher judicial salaries would
have virtually no effect on the performance of federal appellate judges. 4 The
purpose of this Reply is to qualify Baker's interpretation of his results, at least
with regard to judges located in the "Top Five" legal markets of New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. In his original
Professor, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; Director, Law
Firms Working Group (American Bar Foundation/Indiana Law). Some of the data used in
this reply was made available pursuant to a special licensing agreement between the
American Bar Foundation and American Lawyer Media (ALM).
***Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, 2008; Visiting Professor, DePaul
University College of Law, Spring 2008; Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University
Law School, 2004-2008; A.B., J.D., University of Chicago.

I Baker provides a thorough sampling of the various positions on this issue in one of his
footnotes so we decline to repeat them here. Scott Baker, Should We Pay Federal Circuit
Judges More?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 63, 65 n.2 (2008).
2 Id. at 66.

3 Id. at 84-85.
4 Id. at 112.
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analysis, Baker relies upon the average law firm partnership compensation,
adjusted for years in practice and region, to estimate the forgone income - and
hence opportunity costs - of each federal judge. Baker explicitly anticipated
the possibility that this variable would understate the opportunity cost in large
legal markets; thus, he included a Top Five variable plus an interaction term,
which captures the effect of forgone earnings when a judge is located in one of
the nation's five largest legal markets. 5 Baker's discussion, however, does not
formally address the significance of the interaction term, which requires some
additional steps to properly interpret.
Based on our reanalysis of Baker's specifications, it appears that judges in
the largest legal markets often behave differently than their smaller market
counterparts. Specifically, the lower judicial salaries in Top Five markets
strongly correlate with behavior Baker characterizes as "ideological" or
"influence-motivated."
Conversely, while lower judicial salaries in small
markets correlate with longer delays in issuing opinions, the exact opposite
effect describes the behavior of judges in Top Five metropolitan areas.
Our brief Reply proceeds as follows. Part I provides our reanalysis of
Baker's data. Part II establishes an additional comparative context that allows
us to speculate why Top Five legal markets may foster a more intense tradeoff
of influence versus remuneration. Indeed, as we note, the real or perceived
financial tradeoffs are so enormous - and conspicuous - in Top Five markets
that federal judges may feel they have been lumped together with a large,
faceless working class. We conclude by suggesting that the debate over
judicial salaries is rooted in the more general problem of greater income
disparity within the American legal profession.

1.

REANALYSIS OF BAKER'S TOP FIVE AND NETCOST INTERACTION
VARIABLES

To test his various hypotheses on judicial salaries, Baker regresses a series
of measures of judicial performance on a set of variables to see whether those
variables statistically correlate with judicial performance. His key covariate,
NETCOST, reflects the "lump sum value of [a judge's] lost lifetime
eamings. ' '6 To this, he adds variables for judges' net worth, age, gender,
circuit, prior experience, and an indicator variable for whether (=1) or not (=0)
each judge came from a Top Five legal market ("TOPFIVE"), defined as New
7
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Washington, D.C.
Importantly, Baker also includes a multiplicative interaction term
("TOPFIVENETCOST"), defined as TOPFIVE x NETCOST, which "allows
for the increase in one unit of net cost to have a different effect on a judge from

' Id.at 91.
6 Id. at 89.

7Id.
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WORKING CLASS JUDGES

a major market than an increase in one unit of net cost on other judges in the
8
region."
Throughout his article, Baker uses this specification to assess the
relationship between judicial pay and performance. In general terms, his
model can be written as:

(1)
f '(Performance i ) =
A + ,8 1NETCOSTi + /J2 TOPPFIVEi +
/13(TOPFIVEi

x NETCOSTi) + Xiy

where Xi denotes the other control variables in the model and f-(.) denotes
the relevant regression function (linear or probit). Note that Equation (1) can
be rewritten as:

(2)
f '(Performance i )

=

,80 + fl 2TOPPFIVEi +
(A+ / 3TOPFIVEi)NETCOST, + XY
For either (1) or (2),

(3)
df-(Performance) =

+/1 3 (TOPFIVE).

dNETCOST
That is, the marginal impact of NETCOST on performance depends on the
value of TOPFIVE. Seen in this light, it is sometimes useful to think of (2) as:

(4)

f -'(Performancei )
,80

+

=

/32TOPPFIVEi + VliNETCOSTi + Xi",

where sli = /l + /l 3(TOPFIVE) can be thought of as a "quasi-coefficient" for
the marginal impact of NETCOST on performance.
8 Id. at 91. The use of multiplicative interaction terms to model conditional relationships

among covariates in a regression framework has been known for more than five decades.
See D.R. Saunders, Moderator Variables in Prediction, 16
MEASUREMENT 209 (1956).
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A key aspect of models with multiplicative interaction terms, then, is the
conditional nature of their covariate effects. 9 In particular, in a model such as
that in Equation (1), the "direct effects" fl, and 2 represent the effect of
NETCOST and TOPFIVE on performance when the value of the other
covariate is equal to zero. To see why this is the case, note that when, for
example, TOPFIVE takes on a value of zero, Equation (3) becomes
Of- (Performance)

ONETCOST
A similar expression could be written for the marginal effect of TOPFIVE
on performance when NETCOST is equal to zero.
Substantively, this interpretation suggests that while 1 provides a
reasonable estimate of the effect of NETCOST on performance in non-Top
Five markets, the effect of that variable in Top Five markets is equal to V, =fi
+ f83. Likewise, if we wish to conduct inference on this quantity, the estimate
of its standard error is equal to the square root of:
(5)
Var(Vl,) = Var(fi 2) + Var(3 3 ) + 2Cov(/3,f

3 ).

In Baker's example, NETCOST is a continuous variable, while TOPFIVE is
binary. Thus, the coefficient estimate for 031
denotes the relationship between
NETCOST and the respective measure of judicial performance in non-Top
Five markets only (that is, when TOPFIVE = 0). Similarly, y/' - the sum of ,A
and IA - provides the estimate of the relationship between NETCOST and
judicial performance for judges from Top Five markets.
Substantively, Baker explores the relationship between the net cost of being
a judge and various measures of judicial performance. The general expectation
set forth by the "salary matters" theory - and embodied in the position of Chief
Justice Roberts,10 among others 1I - is that:
9 For more extensive treatments of multiplicative interactions in regression models, see
CINDY D. KAM & ROBERT J. FRANZESE, JR., MODELING AND INTERPRETING INTERACTIVE
HYPOTHESES

IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS

(2007);

Robert J. Friedrich, In Defense of

Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations, 26 AM. J. POL. Sc. 797, 797-99
(1982); and Thomas Brambor, William R. Clark & Matt Golder, UnderstandingInteraction
Models: Improving EmpiricalAnalyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63, 63-65 (2006).
10See, e.g., Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, 39 THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTs (Admin. Office of

the U.S. Courts, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2007, at 3-4, available at http://www.supremecourtus.

gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf (reviewing statistics on the reduced
number of federal judges from private practice and asserting that "[i]t
changes the nature of
the federal judiciary when judges are no longer drawn from among the best lawyers in the
practicing bar").
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Holding all else equal, with a high spread between judicial pay and the
next best opportunity, the judiciary will be composed of people who are
more partisan, lazier, more driven by prestige, and/or place a high value
on public service. These judges will act like it by, for instance, voting
more consistently along party lines (the partisan judge), only citing judges
from the same political party (the partisan judge), writing opinions more
slowly (the lazy judge), or investing more time writing decisions other
2
judges will cite (the prestige conscious judge).1
This suggests - and Baker notes - that, all else equal, we should see (a) a
positive relationship between liberal voting and NETCOST for Democraticappointed judges, (b) a negative relationship between liberal voting and
NETCOST for Republican-appointed judges, (c) a positive relationship
between NETCOST and citation bias, (d) a negative relationship between the
authorship of dissenting opinions and NETCOST, (e) a positive relationship
between the length of time judges take to author opinions and NETCOST, and
(f) a positive relationship between NETCOST and the influence of opinions
written by the judge.
The substantive importance of controlling for Top Five legal markets - and
of interacting that indicator with NETCOST - is that, as a general matter, the
effect of forgone compensation will be greater in markets where lawyers'
salaries are higher. Put differently, the extent to which a judge in New York
City who foregoes, for example, $100,000 a year in private-sector salary will
be partisan, lazy, and so forth is expected to be greater than for a judge who
gives up the same amount in Omaha, Nebraska. In model terms, this suggests
that the sign of fl will be the same as that for A8l, such that I V1 > 1,l81. But
while this specification is appropriate for capturing conditioned relationships
of this kind, Baker neglects to discuss in his original article this key difference
between the magnitude of NETCOST effects across different types of markets.
Table 1 re-presents Baker's results regarding the interaction of NETCOST
and TOPFIVE for those models of the form in Equation (1).13 In Table 1, A3,
is
the estimated relationship between NETCOST and judicial performance in
non-Top Five markets, while V/1are estimates of those relationships for judges
from Top Five markets.

" See Baker, supra note 2, at 65 nn.2-5 (collecting public statements from judges, law
school deans, the ABA, and corporate counsel on the negative impact of law judicial pay).
12 Id. at 74.
13 Note that Baker's original analyses present marginal effects for his probit models (that
is, aPr(Yi = I)/aX)), while we present coefficient estimates (3s). The practical relevance of

this distinction is slight.
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Table 1. Estimates of A and yf'
Model
Voting - Democratic Appointees (Table 4 - probit)
Model I (Full Sample)
Model 2 (Subsample w/ NETWORTH)

E(-)

A

V/

+

0.003
(0.023)

+

0.012
(0.034)

0.024
(0.057)
0.318"
(0.180)

Voting - Republican Appointees (Table 5 - probit)

Model 1 (Full Sample)

0.010
(0.022)
0.029

Model 2 (Subsample w/ NETWORTH)

(0.030)
Citation Bias Analysis (Table 7, Model 1 - OLS)

-0.001
(0.005)

Dissents Analysis (Table 8 - probit)
Model 1 (Full Sample)
Model 2 (Subsample w/ NETWORTH)

-0.018

(0.030)
-0.199**

(0.058)

0.699
(3.01)

Model 2 (Subsample w/ NETWORTH)

Extra-Circuit Citations: Total Influence (Table 10,
Model I - OLS)
Extra-Circuit Citations: Avg. Influence (Table 11,
Model 1 - OLS)

-0.011
(0.009)

-0.097**

(0.048)
Speed of Disposition (Table 9 - OLS)
Model 1 (Full Sample)

-0.072"
(0.042)
-0.098
(0.061)

6.67
(4.14)

-0.057
(0.079)
-12.1
(5.62)
-12.7
(8.97)

+
+

0.039

0.065*

(0.02
Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates, as indicated; numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors. E(-) denotes the expected sign of the coefficient for NETCOST under the "salary matters"
hypothesis. One asterisk indicates significance at 5%, two asterisks indicate significance at 1% (onetailed). Data to replicate the results in Table 10 were unavailable.

Several interesting results are apparent from this reanalysis. First, note that
in all four models of voting, the effects of NETCOST are larger in magnitude and consistently in the expected direction - in Top Five legal markets, and two
of those four attain conventional levels of statistical significance.' 4 The
opposite is true for the dissents analysis model, where we find strongly

significant effects in non-Top Five markets, but the absence of such effects in
Top Five markets where judges relinquish proportionally more salary in
exchange for a seat on the bench. Interestingly, the results from the speed of
deposition model run counter to the expectations derived from the "salary

matters" theory: the large, negative estimates of V/1in those models indicate
that, at least in Top Five markets, judges who forego higher salaries actually
"4

Additionally, the effect in Model 2 of Table 5 is significant at 6%.
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complete their work more quickly than those whose opportunity costs are
lower. Finally, note that the estimate of V1 in the opinion influence model is
nearly twice as large as that for /A, a finding that supports the notion that the
tendency for judges to be "influence-motivated" as a function of low judicial
salaries is, again, exacerbated in markets where opportunity costs are higher.
Taken together, these reinterpretations of Baker's findings paint a somewhat
different picture than his original analysis suggests. In our analysis, the nature
of the market in which each judge lives and works is of central importance. In
markets where the opportunity costs of judging are relatively high, lower
judicial salaries more strongly correlate with behavior Baker characterizes as
"ideological" and "influence-motivated." Conversely, in markets where the
relative costs of a judgeship are low, low salaries correlate with judicial
"laziness" more prominently. Put in somewhat different terms, judges in Top
Five legal markets appear willing to trade pecuniary benefits for some measure
of legal or policy influence, while those outside the Top Five view the tradeoff
as one between higher pay and greater leisure.
In many respects, these findings are unsurprising. It is well understood, for
example, that the markets comprising the Top Five are the loci of greatest
influence in the legal and policy communities. 15 Given that judges, and
lawyers more generally, select various markets according to their tastes for
particular characteristics of those markets - including salary, professional
advancement, potential career options - the existence of an influenceremuneration tradeoff in Top Five markets, and of a corresponding leisureremuneration tradeoff outside those markets, is consistent with more general
patterns of career choice in the legal profession.
II.

MAKING ENDS MEET IN A TOP FIVE LEGAL MARKET

To assess the potential effects of low judicial salaries, Baker needed to
operationalize a measure of a federal appellate judge's salary versus "her next
best employment opportunity."' 6 Baker calculates his metric for forgone
earnings (the NETCOST variable) using law firm partnership data supplied by
the Altman Weil Survey of Law Firms Economics, which is published
annually by one of the leading law firm consulting companies. 17 Baker
correctly notes the limitations of the national partnership profitability figures

"5See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence:
A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 271, 304
(1998) (noting that the Seventh, First, Second, and Eighth circuits contain the most
influential judges, as measured by citation analysis); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 566-68 (2008)
(describing the Second and Ninth Circuits as the most influential circuits in the development

of the fair use doctrine).
6 Baker, supra note 2, at 78.
'7

See generally ALTMAN

ECONOMICS (2005).

WEIL PRODUCTIONS,

INC.,

THE SURVEY

OF LAW

FIRM
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published annually in The American Lawyer magazine, which fails to capture
important regional differences in opportunity cost. 18 Of course, these
limitations also cut in the other direction: if federal judges are truly drawn from
"the Nation's very best lawyers,"' 9 it is likely that average compensation
figures for regional law firm partnerships understate the potential lost earnings,
particularly in the nation's largest and most lucrative legal markets. Baker
resolves this data limitation by specifying models that include variables for
Top Five legal markets and a possible NETCOST/TOPFIVE interaction effect.
The impact of large market law firms, both in the public discourse and in
Baker's specifications, becomes more apparent as we wade into some relevant
comparative data. For example, Figure 1 summarizes the relative pay of three
highly coveted legal jobs: federal circuit judge, chief legal officer (CLO) at a
major corporation, and partner at an Am Law 50 law firm. Between 1983 and
2003, the pay disparity between federal circuit court judges and Am Law 50
partners grew from a multiple of four to a multiple of 6.5. No doubt, the
continued heady profits of major corporate law firms have further exacerbated
20
the judicial pay gap.

18See Baker, supra note 2, at 110 & nn.142-43.
19

Chief Justice John G. Roberts, 2005 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 38

THE THIRD BRANCH: NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, Wash. D.C.), Jan. 2006, at 3, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/

publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf.
20

See, e.g., Aric Press & John O'Connor, Lessons of the Am Law 100, AM. LAW., May

2007, at 127 (reporting that in 2006, profits per partner in the Am Law 100 were up 13.4
percent, with "the average among firms headquartered in New York, an astonishing $2.05
million").
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Figure

1

Pay Comparison of US Circuit Judges, Chief Legal
Officers, and Am Law 50 Partners
$1,200,000
Number = Multiple of

$1,000,000
$800,000
$800,000

Circuit Judge's Salary

$600,000
$400,000

$200,000
$1

1983

1993

2003

Year
0 Circuit Judge MAvg CLO Cash Comp. E Avg PPP AmLaw 50

Similarly, corporate general counsels have also prospered relative to federal
appellate judges. Illustrating the attractiveness of this career choice was the
surprise 2006 resignation of Judge Michael Luttig, a prominent jurist on the
Fourth Circuit who left the federal bench to take the top legal job at Boeing
Corporation. 2' According to news reports, Luttig's decision was spurred by
the "financial lure of the Boeing job" and the impending costs of college
education for his two children. 22 Although Luttig, who earned $171,800 as a
federal judge, declined to discuss his Boeing compensation package, the
annual salary and bonus of his counterpart at rival aerospace firm Lockheed
Martin Corporation was over $1.6 million in 2005.23 Further, it is noteworthy
that Luttig resided in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area before he joined
Chicago-based Boeing. His frame of reference is likely to be a Top Five legal
market.
Drawing upon the same Altman Weil data used by Baker, Figure 2 tells a
much more prosaic story about the remuneration of typical law firm partners.
The chart converts the income of senior law firm partners (in their 25th to 29th
year of practice) and chief legal officers into a common scale that permits
comparisons of relative pay over time, including benchmarking against the
consumer price index (CPI).
21 See Jerry Markon, Appeals Court Judge Leaves Life Appointment for Boeing, WASH.

POST, May 11, 2006, at A 11.
22
23

Id.
Id.
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Figure 2
Trend Comparison of Median Compensation,
25-29 Year Partners and Chief Legal Officers
265
235
205
X

"

175
145
115

Year
-0-25-29 Yr. Partner

-4&-Chief Legal Officer (Industry)

-iN-Consumer Price Index (CPI)

Source: Generated from data in Altman Weil, Inc., 2004 Survey of Law Firm Economics

Using 1985 as the base year, the income of senior law firm partners (index
of 187) beats inflation (index of 171) over the next eighteen years but
substantially trails the income of CLOs (index of 265). Yet, during this same
time period, federal circuit court judges actually fare better than the median
law firm partner in his 25th to 29th year. From 1985 to 2003, the salary of a
U.S. Circuit Court Judge increased from $80,40024 to $164,000,25 which results
in an index of 204.26 By contrast, the income of the median law firm partner in
her 25th to 29th year increased from $156,368 to $291,682, which produces a
corresponding index of 187.
As the above figures suggest, the "problem" of judicial pay really hinges on
the reference group. Moreover, the comparison based on reference group is
probably most acute in large legal markets, where federal appellate judges
likely perceive themselves to be at least the intellectual equals of the region's
most elite corporate practitioners, but on a government pay scale, and in a real
estate market that makes them feel all too working class.

24

See THE

LAWYER'S

ALMANAC

759-65 (1986).

25 See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES 10 (Apr. 1, 2003),

available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/judicial&
CISOPTR= 126.
26 The index is generated to compare changes in relative pay - for example, to see if
increases in pay have kept pace with inflation. It is calculated by multiplying the 2003
salary by 100 and then dividing by the 1985 salary [($164,000 x 100)/$80,400 = 204].
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According to the 2006 Altman Weil Survey of Law Firm Economics, the
average compensation of a law firm equity partner in 2004 was $353,033,27
with regional differences that range from $287,828 in the Mountain region 28 to
$440,082 in the South Atlantic region. For the ninety-four Am Law 200 law
firms headquartered in non-Top Five markets, the average profits for equity
partner climbs substantially to $634,420.29 Yet, for the 106 Am Law 200 law
firns headquartered in metropolitan Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, San
Francisco, and Washington, D.C., the average profits per partner is a
stratospheric $1.16 million. 30 Further, within this elite bar there is a pecking
order based on relative profitability (the Am Law 100 and 200) 3 1 and prestige
(Vault). 32 For 2005, the 90th percentile profits per partner of an Am Law 200
firm headquartered in a Top Five market is $2 million per year, 33 versus
$935,000 for a non-Top Five market 34 and $588,666 for the Altman Weil
sample. 35 In Omaha, the salary disparity between a law firm partner and a
federal judge is likely to be a factor of two. But in New York City or
Washington, D.C., it could easily be a tenfold gap.
A more accurate estimate of the true opportunity cost of a federal judgeship
in a major market can arguably be distilled from the large number of lawyers
who leave government service each year for large law firm practice. In a
dataset of 8,485 lawyers who lateraled into a partnership position at an Am
Law 200 firm between 2000 and 2005, 148 were formerly employed with the

27 See Altman Weil, supra note 17, at 166.

28 In the Altman Weil Survey of Law Firm Economics, the Mountain region includes
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
29 These calculations were made from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group,
which has a special licensing agreement with ALM Research, Inc. The $634,420 figure is a
weighted average based on the number of equity partners in each firm.
30 These calculations were made from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group,
which has a special licensing agreement with ALM Research, Inc.
31 The American Lawyer publishes its annual tables for law firm finances in the July (the
Am Law 100) and August (Am Law) issues of the magazine.
32 See, e.g., BRIAN DALTON ET AL., VAULT GUIDE TO THE ToP 100 LAW FIRMS, 2006

EDITION 15 (2005) (ranking the nation's 100 most prestigious law firms based on a survey of
over 15,000 law firm associates at 156 major law firms); William D. Henderson & David
Zaring, Young Associates in Trouble, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1087, 1096-99 (2007) (book
review) (reviewing data on large law firm working conditions and observing a strong
positive correlation between profits and prestige and a strong negative correlation between
firm profits and associate satisfaction).
33 These calculations were made from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group,
which has a special licensing agreement with ALM Research, Inc.
31 These calculations were made from data provided by the Law Firms Working Group,
which has a special licensing agreement with ALM Research, Inc.
35 See Altman Weil, supra note 17, at 167.
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Office of the U.S. Attorneys or another division of the Department of Justice. 36
Presumably, the legal talent and ability of federal appellate judges is at least on
par with career prosecutors or DOJ civil attorneys. Table 2 summarizes
average profits per partner of firms joined by AUSA or DOJ lawyers versus the
average profits per partner of firms joined by all other lateral partners during
the 2000 to 2005 time period. The figures are separated by office joined in
Top Five versus non-Top Five markets.
Table 2. Lateral Partners by Type, Profits of Firm Joined, and Market
Type of
Lateral
AUSA or
DOJ
Other Lateral
Lawyers

Non-Top Five Market
Mean ]
Std
VldN
PPP
Deviation Valid
N

Mean
ppp

Top Five Market
[ Deviation
Sid
ValidN

$668,382

$218,475

N=34

$937,632

$451,366

N=114

$607,250

$242,807

N=2871

$747,137

$318,447

N=5466

Obviously, when leaving government service, AUSA and DOJ attorneys
tend to garner a substantial price premium over other lateral partners,
especially in Top Five legal markets. Using an independent sample t-test, the
higher average income - of $61,132 - received by the government attorneys in
the non-Top Five markets approaches statistical significance. 37 Yet, the higher
average income - of $190,495 - for AUSA and DOJ lawyers in the Top Five
markets is statistically significant at a very high level. 38 These statistics
suggest that a federal judge's forgone earnings, particularly in a Top Five
market, may be lower than Baker's original estimates.
CONCLUSION

In many respects, the acrimony over low judicial pay is rooted in the more
general problem of income stratification within the legal profession as a whole.
For example, in the famous 1975 Chicago Lawyers I study, social scientists at
the American Bar Foundation conducted detailed interviews with a random
sample of 777 lawyers in Chicago and surrounding Cook County. 39 In 1995,

the researchers replicated their study with another random sample (Chicago

36 The lateral dataset was compiled by ALM Research, Inc. from news releases. In turn,

the Law Firms Working Group added in variables related to profits per partner. For a
detailed discussion of this dataset, including its broader application to mobility trends within
law firms, see Marc Galanter & William D. Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008).

37 We calculated p = .072, indicating statistical significance at 7.2% (one-tailed).
38 We calculated p < .001, indicating statistical significance at <0.1% (one-tailed).
39 See JoiHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 9 (1982).

0.

LAUMANN,

CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
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Lawyers I/).40

One of the most striking changes in the intervening twenty

years was the change in relative income among different segments of the bar.
After adjusting for inflation, the average income of lawyers in Chicago's
largest firms had increased dramatically from $144,985 in 1975 to $271,706 in
1995. 4 1 In contrast, the incomes in all other practice settings, with the
exception of in-house counsel, remained flat or declined. 42 Solo practitioners
fared the worse, with median income, in constant 1995 dollars, declining from
$99,159 to $55,000. 4 3 During this two-decade period, the number of solo
44
lawyers working a second job increased from two to thirty-two percent.
Unfortunately, there is ample evidence that this pattern of income stratification
is shared by much of the United States workforce. 4 5
An important consideration in any judicial salary reform effort is its
potential impact on American income disparity in general and, more
specifically, the problematic salary stratification already existing in the legal
profession. The stratification is particularly problematic in Top Five legal
markets and, as this Reply has demonstrated, the effects of judicial salary
reform will likely be unique in these markets. Admittedly, raising judicial
salaries may benefit recruitment and retention. Prices are dynamic, however,
and firms may respond to any such change by raising salaries for top-level
attorneys. Thus, raising compensation levels for federal judges may actually
have problematic consequences. First, our findings suggest that such firm
responses will be disproportionately concentrated in large markets, resulting in
continued stratification of legal compensation in those markets. Second, firms,
perhaps in order to implement such a response, may increase the already
substantial costs of legal services. To this end, it is important to consider the
indirect impacts - and possible unintended consequences - of judicial
compensation reform.
Amidst broad systemic changes and problems with income stratification in
the United States and the legal profession, as well as concerns about the quality
of the federal bench, a difficult two-fold policy question arises: (1) Is the high
cost of living and low relative pay of federal judges in large markets fostering
a self-selection dynamic - e.g., influence motivation - that undermines judicial
decision making; and (2), if so, will raising judicial salaries mitigate that
problem - and/or potentially create others - particularly if the underlying
stratification dynamic continues apace?
These are important empirical
questions that we cannot hope to answer in a short reply essay. Yet, the clarity
40 See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW STRUCTURE OF THE BAR

9-28

(2005) (explaining prior research and its comparison to 1995 data).
41 Id. at 163.
42

Id. at 160.

43 Id.

at 163.

44 Id. at 164.
45 See generally ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY

(1995).
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of these questions is a testament to the quality and rigor of Professor Baker's
study. We commend him on a job well done.

